If so, then we can run the above arguments to show that either i this something else has structure, in which case dynamic nominalism is false or ii it is structureless, in which case structure can arise from the structureless, which means that non-representational structure could as well.
On the other hand, it may be supposed that we, as representations, exist independently of, so without explanation in terms of, anything else. The problem here, again, is that if representational structure can exist independently, without explanation, then so can other kinds of structure and we lack grounds for restricting structure to the former.
See, also. The goal, here, is not to show that reason can be justified independently of rational principles.
Whether or not that is possible, it is a topic for another occasion. For example, by appealing to our cognitive limitations; see, e. Davidson For helpful questions, comments, and suggestions, I would like to thank James R. Brown, Bernard D. I am especially grateful to Henry Laycock, for ongoing insight and clarity, and Crawford Elder, whose was an inspiration for much of my thinking on these topics. Chomsky, N. What kind of creatures are we? New York: Columbia University Press.
Google Scholar. Dasgupta, S. Realism and the absence of value. The Philosophical Review, , — Article Google Scholar. Davidson, D. On the very idea of a conceptual scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 47, 5— Deleuze, G. Difference and repetition P. Patton, Trans. Elder, C. Familiar objects and their shadows. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Book Google Scholar. Goldstick, D. Reason, truth, and reality. Toronto: University of Toronto Press. Goodman, N. Words, worlds, works. Erkenntnis, 9, 57— Hacking, I. The emergence of probability. Representing and intervening. A tradition of natural kinds. Philosophical Studies, 61, — Working in a new world: The taxonomic solution.
Horwich Ed. The social construction of what? Cambridge: Harvard University Press. How inevitable are the results of successful science? Philosophy of Science, 67, S58—S Historical ontology.
Natural kinds: Rosy Dawn, scholastic twilight. Royal institute of philosophy, Supplement 61 pp. Why is there philosophy of mathematics at all?
Hinchliff, M. The puzzle of change. Philosophical Perspectives, 10, — Kuhn, T. The structure of scientific revolutions. In short, it could have added lots more, but the definition is not bad. The definition is certainly wrong about one thing: autism is not just a childhood disorder, but almost always for life.
It is a developmental disorder that can be recognised very early, usually no later than 30 months, for which there is no known cause and no known cure. At most, it is widely believed, a child can learn to compensate for the deficits, although there are some remarkable recoveries. Another aspect of the definition at which many would protest is its regarding autism as a 'disorder', now the standard euphemism for mental illness.
Many advocates for autism insist that it is not a disorder but a disability. In , indeed in , autism was a rare developmental disorder with a quite definite, narrowly characterised stereotype. Today, we have the autistic spectrum.
We have high-functioning people with autism. We have Asperger's, a name introduced into English in by the British psychiatric social worker Lorna Wing. It is adapted from a diagnosis made in in Vienna by Hans Asperger, a distinguished paediatrician in the German-speaking world, whom Wing made prominent in English.
It now tends to refer to people who had few difficulties acquiring language, but have all the other autistic symptoms.
It is often loosely synonymous with high-functioning autism. Consider a certain kind of teenager or adult, the high-functioning autist. I shall leave Asperger out of it. The typical case is someone who grew from an autistic child into an adult who had full or almost full possession of language, and some residual eccentricities of an autistic sort, some of which are socially disadvantageous, some possibly advantageous. Temple Grandin is the most famous example.
She emphasises her empathy with animals, urging that her way of seeing the world is closer to that of animals than to most humans. She has had a significant effect on American slaughterhouse techniques. High-functioning autists are beginning to crop up in fiction, much as multiple personalities did twenty years ago.
Some high-functioning autistic people talk of forming an autism liberation front. Stop trying to make us like you. We do some things better than you, and you do some things better than us, so leave us be.
As I said, A in my view is true for multiple personality. But it is absolutely false for high-functioning autism. It is almost as absurd as saying that autism did not exist before , when Kanner introduced the name. But B, I believe, is true. Before , maybe even before , high-functioning autism was not a way to be a person. There probably were a few individuals who were regarded as retarded and worse, who recovered, retaining the kinds of foible that high-functioning autistic people have today.
But people didn't experience themselves in this way, they didn't interact with their friends, their families, their employers, their counsellors, in the way they do now. As I see it, this kind of person, in the sense of B, could not have existed until some time after autism itself had been diagnosed, for the first such individuals had to be diagnosed as autistic and then somewhat mysteriously 'recover', grow out of it, acquire social skills, be able to understand what other people are thinking and feeling, overcome, or at any rate live unproblematically with, the obsessive need for literalness.
Once there were 'recovered' autists, other adults, who had never been diagnosed as autistic, could be seen as having similar difficulties, even if their childhood was not as bad. Hence the class of high-functioning autists rapidly expanded.
Some will have strengths in one direction, some strengths in another. How does making up people take place? Long ago, 'hip' and 'square' became common names in white middle-class culture. By a parody of Nietzsche, two new kinds of people came into being, the hip and the square. As is the way of slang imported from another social class, both kinds had short shelf lives. But I am concerned with the human sciences, from sociology to medicine, and they are driven by several engines of discovery, which are thought of as having to do with finding out the facts, but they are also engines for making up people.
The first seven engines in the following list are designed for discovery, ordered roughly according to the times at which they became effective. The eighth is an engine of practice, the ninth of administration, and the tenth is resistance to the knowers. Create Norms! Reclaim our identity! The success of the seven engines of discovery has been astonishing. It is no criticism to say that they have side effects, that they sometimes bring new kinds of people into being, in the modest sense of proposition B, and that they affect the kinds of people they study.
Here are some brief illustrations of what I mean by each of my ten engines. I shall use autism and obesity as contrasting illustrations. They remind us that the ten engines work in different ways on different kinds of people.
The first large-scale, well-designed attempt to count autistic children was made in Camberwell, getting a rate of 4. There are now about eighty published countings, and growing, as is the proportion of people with autism. On 4 May, Reuters reported that 'the first national surveys of autism show the condition is very common among US children.
You will know the horror figures for obesity rates. There is, however, a big difference between autism and obesity, which is nowadays even more assiduously counted than autism.
Whether obesity is as bad as it ought to be or not, its prevalence has immensely increased, all over the world, in the past two decades. In contrast, we debate whether the swollen figures for autism show that the prevalence of autism is increasing, or only that we have expanded definitions and are more alert for possible diagnoses.
In the case of obesity, quantity is built in. We have our bathroom scales. In , the Society of Actuaries and the Association of Life Insurance Medical Directors of America defined being 'overweight' as weighing more than the average for insured people of one's own age, height and sex, and obesity as 'an excessive accumulation of body fat'.
During the s, the Body Mass Index took hold, the ratio of the weight of a person in kilogrammes divided by the square of their height in metres.
In , the World Health Organisation, in company with numerous national bodies, defined being overweight as having a BMI of more than 25, and obesity as a BMI of more than Marilyn Monroe varied between 21 and During the past twenty years models in Playboy have gone down from 19 to Fauja Singh, the fastest man on earth over the age of 90, has a BMI of Autism resists quantity.
There are many diagnostic questionnaires, but it's hard to quantify deficits. Georges Canguilhem's The Normal and the Pathological showed how medicine acquired the concept of normalcy not long after Many of our examples are deviations from the norm, for better genius or worse obesity. Canguilhem addressed the question: which comes first, normalcy or deviance?
There is no general answer. Sometimes one, sometimes the other, often hand in hand. Quantitative norms followed Adolphe Quetelet's homme moyen in the midth century. To say that autism is a developmental disorder is to say that autistic children do not develop normally. Norms for development ' the ages at which children usually do such and such; can be expected to do such and such; ought to be able to do such and such tie their shoelaces ' are a standard part of manuals on child-rearing for parents.
This is the fundamental engine of the social sciences. It began around , when Francis Galton devised the correlation coefficient. Quetelet had the mean, but Galton made deviation from the mean the core of his social philosophy, and so devised the correlation coefficient. We try to correlate autism with everything, not excluding the relative lengths of the mother's fingers and amount of testosterone in the foetus.
Some correlations need no statistical theory or analysis: four out of five children with autism are male. On the other hand, bodyweight needs subtle statistics. A BMI between 25 and 30 is said to be bad for you because of a significant correlation with numerous risk factors, which are themselves statistical entities.
It is a strange situation. Being overweight, unlike being obese, does not importantly affect your life expectancy, but unless you are a body builder or rugby forward, it will make you less attractive in current society, less physically active and so forth.
Clinical medicine. We medicalise kinds of deviant people relentlessly, not always with success. The modern concept of child abuse was introduced by doctors around , but there have been substantial battles over the 'medical model' ever since. There have always been fat people, some of them ill. But stout, plump persons have often been in fashion, as the works of Rubens or Renoir remind us.
A new generation of anti-craving medicines is about to make a fortune for its owners. Autism was regarded as a diagnosis made by a child psychiatrist, and so it is filed as a mental disorder and hence in the end as a medical problem. But if we regard it more and more as a disability, it may seem less and less medical. Biology , including neurology. Autism is a disability but it has biological causes, specifically neurobiological. One of the great moral benefits of biologising is that it relieves a person of responsibility.
If overeating is attributed to chemical imbalance it ceases to be a moral defect. There is now a constant drive to trace the medical to the biological, and the biological to the genetic. This is not wholly new. The differences of the management and leadership which is management people will be more work focus but people who have leadership skill which will people focus. Work focus which related to the college environment show that the lecturer will be. Therefore, given a chance to choose as one of the Nobel Committee member, I would definitely suggest Leon Festinger who has founded the social comparison theory as one of the most deserving recipient.
Social comparison theory explains that we learn about our own abilities and attitudes by comparing ourselves to other people. When experiencing uncertainty to evaluate our.
According to Ian Hacking Making Up people, based on historical analysis, where it refers to the simultaneous process whereby new ideas serve to create newly categorized kind of people.
In other words, especially when it comes to human reality, the latter asserts that the ontological reality …show more content… As we mentioned earlier, dynamic Nominalism works when new ideas are invented and the new category is set up, by so-called experts, at the same time new kind of people are come into being or made to fit those categories. Yet this new idea was not formed in vacuums rather there were factors and conditions that give rise or set the motion for such invention of ideas.
As a result, the census was created, new categories were crafted, to determine the inner character, the moral quality, of black people based on the outward action and appearance.
Thus based on the data gathered not only newly ascribed ontological reality was created but also newly incriminated, based on skin color, black people identity was created.
Yet due to this flexibility, dynamic Nominalism attempt to show that it is futile to domesticate or even control both human ontological identity and reality, especially as it was and is done by the experts or so-called powerful and dominant people in the socio-cultural and political.
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